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Abstract
This paper analyzes how patterns of international cooperation are affected if a group of
states, led by a major power, pursues a strategy of “contested multilateralism” (CM).
We conceptualize CM as a reaction to deadlock in institutional adjustment bargaining
where CM lowers the gains actors can reap from cooperation in the short run. We
demonstrate that, in the long run, CM nevertheless can have positive effects on
international cooperation and specify when this is the case. Because of the costs
associated with it, CM conveys a credible signal of the resolve of a dissatisfied group
of states to contest the institutional status quo. Due to this capacity, CM alters the
institutional and strategic environment within which institutional adjustment bargaining
takes place. As a result, CM opens up the possibility for inter-institutional accommo-
dation that increases realized cooperation gains. We probe the plausibility of our
theoretical reasoning with empirical case studies on competitive regime creation in
multilateral development finance and on regime-shifting in the governance of interna-
tional trade in genetically modified organisms.
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1 Introduction
World politics is replete with international institutions which create joint gains,
but distribute those gains unevenly among states (Krasner 1991). An uneven
distribution of cooperation gains often creates tensions in which those states
gaining less than others demand institutional change. The most prominent case
in point is the attempt of rising powers to induce change in the core institutions
of the existing international order so that cooperation gains may be more
evenly distributed among established and rising powers (Zangl et al. 2016).
Over the past decade, rising powers have been acting to induce institutional
change in major international institutions, including the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB)
(Hopewell 2015; Vestergaard and Wade 2015). Since established powers
defended the institutional status quo rather successfully, China and its partners
decided more recently to establish new international institutions, such as the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank
(NDB) and the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization Agreement. Thus,
rising powers have responded to their dissatisfaction with the degree of change
they have been able to effect within the existing institutional order by setting
up a set of new international institutions which overlap in their competences
with legacy institutions.
The tendency of states that are dissatisfied with the distribution of cooperation
gains within an existing focal institution to establish a competing institution is by
no means limited to rising powers. A group of countries led by Germany, for
example, created the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) because the
International Energy Agency (IEA) distributed cooperation gains disproportionately
towards countries with strong fossil fuel and nuclear industries (van de Graaf
2013). Similarly, a group of pro-whaling nations, led by Iceland and Norway,
created the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO) after a
group of anti-whaling nations, led by Japan, had prevented institutional change
that would have redistributed the cooperation gains created by the International
Whaling Commission (Gillespie 2002). In addition, a group of states, led by the
European Union (EU), which was dissatisfied by how the WTO distributed the
joint gains realized through cooperation on international trade in genetically mod-
ified organisms (GMOs), established the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
(Schneider and Urpelainen 2013).
These cases suggest that there is an overarching tendency for groups of states which,
first, are dissatisfied by how a focal institution distributes cooperation gains and,
second, prove unable to effectuate meaningful institutional change, to contest that focal
institution by setting up an alternative institutional framework. In conceptual terms,
such groups of states exercise contested multilateralism (CM) (Morse and Keohane
2014). The essence of CM is that a group of states strategically uses one international
institution – existing or newly created – as an instrument to contest the governance
activities of another international institution.
This paper analyzes how the strategies of CM impact on the ability of states to reap
joint gains through institutionalized cooperation. We conceptualize CM as embedded in
institutional adjustment bargaining between defenders and challengers of a given
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institutional status quo (Urpelainen and Van de Graaf 2014).1 Challengers are dissat-
isfied with the institutional status quo and thus seek to change the rules institutionalized
within the focal institution – rules they perceive as favoring the defenders, a group that
often includes the founders of the institution.2 Defenders, in contrast, are satisfied with the
institutional status quo and thus seek to prevent change, as the rules inherited from the past
favor their interests more than could any currently conceivable alternative. Against this
backdrop, we understand the exercise of CM by the challengers of the institutional status
quo to be a reaction to deadlock in institutional adjustment bargaining. Our premise is that
deadlock results from challengers’ inability to credibly communicate the degree to which
they are resolved to challenge defenders over the institutional status quo. Faced with this
inefficacy of “voice,” challengers will choose partial “exit”, shifting their efforts to another
institution – existing or newly created –which they perceive, or deliberately construct to be,
more conducive to their interests (cf. Hirschman 1970).
Since CM aims at “crafting rules in one elemental regime that are incompatible with
those in another” (Raustiala and Victor 2004: 301–302), it erodes the causal mecha-
nisms through which – according to the logic of “cooperation under anarchy” –
international institutions facilitate cooperation. CM breaks the convergence of expec-
tations that define cooperation while it reduces the capacity of international institutions
to serve as focal points among states (Drezner 2013). Thus, by re-introducing uncer-
tainty about the behavior of actors, CM lessens the individual and collective gains
states can capture through institutionalized cooperation.
However, we argue that precisely because it generates such costs, the exercise of
CM can be an informative and credible signal that helps revitalize deadlocked process-
es of institutional adjustment bargaining. Because of the immediate political costs and
risks outlined above, CM represents a clear signal of the challengers’ dissatisfaction
with the status quo and of their resolve to challenge it. At the same time, since CM is
clearly distinct from reverting to unilateralism or bilateralism, it signals their continued
interest in institutionalized cooperation.3 By sending these signals, CM changes the
institutional and strategic environment for institutional adjustment bargaining. In doing
so, it can help prompt defenders and challengers to find new cooperative arrangements.
If such an arrangement is indeed arrived at, CM will re-create the gains states realize
through institutionalized cooperation.
By fleshing this theoretical argument out, we contribute to developing a logic of
“cooperation in a thickly institutionalized international system.” That is, we update the
1 In contrast to Morse and Keohane (2014: 385) who emphasize that their article offers “not an explanatory
theory, but provides a useful framework for understanding changes in regime complexes and the strategies that
generate such changes,” the present paper fleshes out an explanatory approach which explicitly connects the
logic of institutional proliferation to the logic of institutional accommodation in a single coherent theoretical
approach. Our approach explicitly conceptualizes CM as a credible signal of dissatisfaction with a given focal
institution. Morse and Keohane (2014: 391), by contrast, merely discuss credibility problems of the dissatis-
fied coalition as a reason for failed institutional adaptation.
2 A focal institution is the “default institutional alternative” for addressing cooperation problems within a
given issue area of international relations (Jupille et al. 2013: 9).
3 Unilateral and bilateral responses may reflect the motivation to delegitimate extant institutions and/or to
enhance the status or reputation of the challenging states. CM, by contrast, is too costly to execute and to
sustain, if the challenging states are not motivated to change the institutional underpinnings. Thus, given its
costliness, exercising CM sends a clear and unequivocal signal of resolve to challenge the institutional status
quo.
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well-established logic of “cooperation under anarchy” (Axelrod and Keohane 1985;
Oye 1986) which revolves around two core assumptions: first, that international
institutions are discrete entities which operate in isolation from one another and,
second, that states pursue their interests and seek to maximize their payoffs through
strategic action within individual institutions (Keohane 1984).
Neither of these assumptions is empirically fully accurate anymore. Contemporary
international institutions are not discrete entities operating in isolation, but subject to
inter-institutional influences and embedded in regime complexes (Alter and Raustiala
2018; Raustiala and Victor 2004). As a result, states gain opportunities to pursue
interests and maximize payoffs not only within, but also across overlapping interna-
tional institutions (Jupille et al. 2013). Those possibilities for cross-institutional action
affect the ability of international institutions to facilitate cooperation among states in a
way that cannot be accommodated in the logic of “cooperation under anarchy.”4
To develop the logic of “cooperation in a thickly institutionalized international
system,” we build on existing research which elucidates how states take advantage of
regime complexes to pursue their own interests (Alter and Meunier 2009; Helfer 2009;
Jupille et al. 2013; Morse and Keohane 2014). While this research develops the micro-
foundations for the theoretical analysis of international cooperation in the contemporary
international system, it leaves unexplored the very fundamental question of how cross-
institutional action impacts patterns of international cooperation and the ability of states
to reap joint gains. As indicated above, our key contribution lies in tackling this
question by theorizing how strategies of contested multilateralism (CM) affect the
realization of joint gains, through cooperation within formal international institutions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 situates our contribu-
tion within the burgeoning literature on what we call “cooperation in a thickly institu-
tionalized international system.” Section 3 conceptualizes CM as being embedded in
institutional adjustment bargaining and theorizes how a lack of credible signals during
institutional adjustment bargaining may lead to deadlock. We analyze the bargaining
situation, illuminating its core features, by using a formal spatial model. Drawing on this
model, Section 4 demonstrates how CM influences institutional adjustment bargaining.
Moreover, it elaborates, theoretically, on how inter-institutional accommodation follow-
ing CM may ultimately re-create joint gains realized through cooperation. In Section 5,
we move to two case studies probing the plausibility of our theoretical reasoning for
both variants of CM.We study, first, the creation of the AIIB as a competitor to the WB
(“competitive regime creation”) and, second, the shifting of the regulatory efforts in
international trade in genetically modified organisms (GMOs) from the WTO to the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (“regime shifting”).5 An appendix to the
4 In a thinly institutionalized international system, states may equally decide to pursue cross-institutional
action. Decisive for our argument is, however, that such actions are not captured by the theoretical logic of
“cooperation under anarchy”. To differentiate between “cooperation in a thickly institutionalized international
system” and “cooperation under anarchy” therefore introduces an analytical distinction.
5 In contrast to forum-shopping, regime shifting and competitive regime creation are collective strategies
pursued by like-minded groups of states in order to shift, in their favor, the institutional underpinnings of
international cooperation on a particular issue or in a particular issue area. Because of this commonality, Morse
and Keohane (2014) conceive the two strategies as forms of contested multilateralism. Our theoretical logic
applies to both variants of contested multilateralism which follow the same rationale and create the same
implications for institutionalized cooperation. However, it does not apply to forum-shopping which is an
individual strategy that does not aim at changing the institutional underpinnings of cooperation.
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article presents the results of a computer simulation which translates the static spatial
model in Sections 3 and 4 into a dynamic setting of iterated interaction.6 Thus, the
computer simulation carves out how temporal dynamics affect the impact of CM on the
realization of cooperation gains. In doing so, it validates the robustness of our theoretical
reasoning.
2 Regime complexes, cross-institutional strategic action
and international cooperation
In the last decade, IR scholars have made considerable progress in understanding the
cross-institutional strategies that states use to pursue their interests in a “thickly
institutionalized international system.” However, much existing research has neglected
the implications of the different forms of cross-institutional strategic action for patterns
of international cooperation (Busch 2007; Helfer 2009; Urpelainen and Van de Graaf
2014). Thus, our paper advances the (so far, very limited) literature which has begun
exploring the fundamentally important question of how cross-institutional state action
impacts prospects for international cooperation. On the one hand, Drezner (2013)
argues that regime complexes undermine the capacity of international institutions to
facilitate institutionalized cooperation because powerful states use their opportunities
for cross-institutional action to avoid costly obligations. On the other, Gehring and
Faude (2014) argue that cross-institutional strategizing gives rise to a functional
division of labor among overlapping international institutions that stabilizes
cooperation.
Both contributions develop, in the context of moving from “cooperation under
anarchy” to “cooperation in a thickly institutionalized international system,” theoretical
mechanisms capable of explaining the two extreme outcomes possible: cooperation
breakdown and inter-institutional stabilization of cooperation. However, neither con-
tribution explicitly connects the logic of institutional proliferation to the logic of
institutional accommodation in a single and coherent theoretical approach. Thus, IR
research has yet to grasp the gradual effects on cooperation gains that lie between the
extremes of cooperation breakdown and its inter-institutional stabilization, and which
are largely determined by the particular characteristics of institution-overarching inter-
actions among groups of states.
We start to close this gap by synthesizing the two existing approaches. Whereas
Drezner (2013) assumes that states exploit possibilities for cross-institutional action
without taking the implications for international cooperation into account, Gehring and
Faude (2014) assume that states care primarily about the implications of their cross-
institutional behavior on international cooperation. These different analytical starting
points lead directly to the authors’ opposing conclusions. In contrast, we integrate
negative and positive implications of cross-institutional action into a single coherent
theoretical logic. This approach allows us to infer – contra Drezner – that although
cross-institutional action is likely to be detrimental to cooperation in the short-term,
cooperation breakdown is by no means inevitable. Moreover, in contrast to Gehring
and Faude, our approach is able to explain inter-institutional coordination without
6 The online Appendix is available on the Review of International Organizations’s webpage.
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assuming that states avoid cross-institutional actions detrimental to the ability of
international institutions to facilitate cooperation.
3 CM as a result of failed institutional adjustment bargaining
We start by outlining a comprehensive analytical framework embedding CM in a
situation of failed institutional adjustment bargaining.
3.1 Deadlocked institutional adjustment bargaining
Our starting point is a situation in which cooperation in the existing focal institution
creates gains that both defenders and challengers are interested in. At the same time, the
gains realized through cooperation in a focal institution are distributed unevenly among
the two groups of states (Krasner 1991). This uneven distribution creates tensions in
which those states gaining less demand institutional change. As a result, institutional
adjustment bargaining becomes necessary.
For various theoretically grounded reasons, such institutional adjustment bargaining
may fail. First, a belief in the longevity of a focal institution and knowledge of the
importance of the collective goods it produces may lead states toward overly confron-
tational negotiating strategies. Conflict over the redistribution of cooperation gains may
trump the common interest in creating cooperation gains in the first place (Lax and
Sebenius 1986; Fearon 1998). Second, institutional developments are path-dependent
(Pierson 2004). Thus, institutional adjustment bargaining may lead to deadlock even
when efficiency gains are available; this is because, as it evolves, an institution will
endogenously create an interest in keeping it stable among a large number of its
members. Third, an international institution may not only strongly favor a particular
segment of its members, but indeed be captured by this group and its private interests
(Urpelainen and Van de Graaf 2014). If so, institutional adjustment bargaining is
unlikely to lead to a commonly acceptable outcome.
In spite of the merits of these specific problems, we believe there is one theoretically
more fundamental, and substantially important, reason why institutional adjustment
bargaining may systematically fail: information asymmetry. Since the true level of
resolve to challenge the focal institution is information private to the challengers, they
may fail to credibly communicate their resolve (Morrow 1999). The defenders are
inherently uncertain about factors such as the challengers’ perception of the distribution
of cooperation gains, the location of their red lines in the institutional adjustment
bargaining, or the degree to which they’re discounting future gains (Narlikar and
Van Houten 2010). In short, the defenders cannot know exactly how prepared the
challengers are to seriously take on the institutional status quo. As a result, the
defenders may miscalculate rationally “due to lack of information” and underestimate
challenger resolve (Fearon 1995: 381; cf. Morrow 1994). If so, the lack of credible
signals will lead to deadlock and to the two groups being unable to realize institutional
adjustment as an alternative outcome – a resolution that both sides would actually
prefer (Fearon 1995).
A lack of credible information is theoretically fundamental for explaining failure in
institutional adjustment bargaining (Morrow 1999). It sheds light on why conflict over
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the distribution of cooperative gains prevents their creation in the first place. It can also
explain why a group of states which profits disproportionately from the increasing
returns created by an international institution over time is not able to strike a deal which
ensures the operability of that institution despite contestation. Moreover, a lack of
credible signals can explain why a group of states which has captured an international
institution, and is therefore able to distribute the costs and benefits among its members,
may not be able to do so in a way that keeps the institution operable.
3.2 The responses to deadlock in a “Thickly Institutionalized International System”
and the costs of CM
Under the theoretical logic of “cooperation under anarchy,” two extreme choices are
available to the challengers when institutional adjustment bargaining becomes
deadlocked. On the one hand, they may decide to formally exit the institution and turn
to unilateralism. On the other hand, the challengers may stay within the institution and
continue to participate in its activities while possibly seeking to continuously challenge
it from within.
The logic of “cooperation in a thickly institutionalized international system” opens
the space for a third reaction to deadlock in institutional adjustment bargaining:
resorting to CM. That is, the logic of “cooperation in a thickly institutionalized system”
accounts for the possibility that the challengers may try to realize their interests by
creating a new institution (“competitive regime creation”), or by shifting their efforts to
adjust the institutional structure to another existing institution, with a mandate over-
lapping with that of the focal institution (“regime shifting”) (Morse and Keohane
2014). CM therefore represents an alternative to the two possible reactions to deadlock
envisaged by the logic of “cooperation under anarchy.”
The exercise of CM enables the reigniting of institutional adjustment bargaining,
previously deadlocked, but it also creates two types of costs: initial (fixed) setup costs
that will need to be borne by the challengers, and the continuous long-term costs
attached to cooperation that will be faced by both challengers and defenders. Each of
these costs lie – implicitly or explicitly – at the core of the pessimistic view on CM.
First, to exercise CM, the group of dissatisfied states must be able to absorb the costs
that accrue from the process of establishing a new international institution or from
expanding the mandate of an already existing one. Both variants of CM are the costliest
institutional choices among those available in a thickly institutionalized international
system, as discussed by Jupille et al. (2013: Chapter 2). Political capital needs to be
spent, reputation invested, and possibly tough negotiations among those engaging in
CM need to be conducted, all this with often uncertain results as both CM strategies are
risky to undertake. They only yield a significant amount of joint gains if a sufficiently
large number of states decides to support them (Schneider and Urpelainen 2013).
The participation of a major power in the process significantly elevates the likeli-
hood that the challengers are able to surmount these hurdles. A major power offers
focal point solutions and the resources necessary to put a viable institutional arrange-
ment in place. It will wield an arsenal of sticks and carrots to incentivize less powerful
states to join the new institutional arrangement or else accept expansion of the mandate
of an existing institution (Lake 2009; Schneider and Urpelainen 2013). A major power
is therefore in a good position to ensure that there will be enough political support to
Contested multilateralism as credible signaling: how strategic...
make the new institutional arrangement viable. By establishing a roughly symmetrical
power distribution between challengers and defenders, it also prevents the latter from
simply imposing their will on the former and from ignoring their demands.
Second, moving to the long-term costs, CM is not only costly and risky to execute
but also potentially very costly to sustain. By exercising CM, states craft rules in one
international institution that are incompatible with those in another. Thus, CM inevi-
tably creates “strategic inconsistency” (rivaling rules), as discussed by Raustiala and
Victor (2004: 301–302). As a result, states gain greater leeway in determining their own
behavior. Inherent in strategic inconsistency is therefore a misalignment of behavioral
expectations and, by implication, a reduction of the realized cooperation gains. In other
words, the existence of two sets of rivaling rules effectively erodes the very purpose of
cooperation, where both groups abide by a common set of rules, increasing the
predictability of their behavior and thus creating space for the mutual alignment of
expectations. In this vein, four specific ways in which strategic inconsistency under-
mines cooperation gains may be identified (Drezner 2013: 283–290): it dilutes the
“power of previously constructed focal points”; it raises the costs of monitoring
defections from existing institutions; it weakens “actors’ overall sense of legal obliga-
tion”; and it raises “the costs of national compliance with international mandates with
more severe resource constraints.” The core of the problem CM creates for cooperation
lies precisely in the misalignment of behaviour and expectations as these negative
effects kick in.
Our theoretical logic is sufficiently general to apply not only to international
institutions with purely regulatory purposes, but also to international institutions with
operative purposes. Even in institutions with predominantly operative targets, the core
of the political conflict often lies in how the operations are carried out, who bears the
costs and who receives the benefits. This is exemplified by the case of multilateral
development finance discussed in Section 5.1.
While this problem is not central to our argumentation, we should also highlight that
the size of the costs of CM, and its attractiveness, varies systematically across issue
areas. It depends on the degree to which an issue-area is characterized by network
effects and barriers to entry (Lipscy 2017): The lower the network effects and barriers
to entry, the higher the incentives to cooperate through a differentiated institutional
framework (Lipscy 2017: Chapter 2). The attractiveness of CM varies accordingly: The
higher the incentives to cooperate through a differentiated institutional framework, the
higher the attractiveness of CM for states that are dissatisfied with the institutional
status quo (Lipscy 2017: Chapter 2). By implication, the higher the attractiveness of
CM, the higher the challengers’ bargaining leverage already in intra-institutional
adjustment bargaining. Incomplete information about challengers’ level of resolve
explains why CM also occurs when defenders know it is an attractive option for
challengers.
3.3 Spatial model
Our informal discussion suggests that CM brings about important short- and long-term
costs. To understand the effects of CM on cooperation more precisely, we now start to
develop a spatial model that will help us extract the essence of CM as a bargaining
situation (see Hinich and Munger 1997 for an overview of the spatial modeling
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techniques we follow). Based on the model, we are able to formulate a specific
proposition summarizing our key insights into CM as a case of a bargaining failure.
The first step in the development of the model is the identification of the actual
dimension of contest between challengers and defenders, whom we treat as internally
cohesive collective actors that are equally powerful. Within institutional adjustment
bargaining, the core of political contestation lies in the amount of behavioral adjustment
each of the two group actors is expected to undergo in response to particular institutional
provisions, as contrasted with each group’s preferred behavior. Cooperation is defined
as the mutual adjustment of patterns of state behavior against the backdrop of discord. It
requires that the actions of separate states are “brought into conformity with one another
through a process of negotiation” (Keohane 1984: 51). In our case of institutional
adjustment bargaining, cooperation is achieved if a group of defenders and a group of
challengers (partially) adjust their behavior toward the preferences of the other side.
The second core feature of our model is the divergence between Defender and
Challenger on the exact shape of the common behavioral pattern and its distributive
effects. Formally, we capture this disagreement in the spatial model in Fig. 1. The axes
depict the amount of patterned behavioral change by each of the two actors as described
in the previous paragraph: on the horizontal axis for the Challenger, on the vertical axis
for the Defender. In line with the conflicting interests over the distribution of cooper-
ation gains, the ideal point for the Challenger group (C*) is located at maximum
behavioral adjustment by the Defender group, and only at limited adjustment of the
Challenger’s own group behavior. Analogously, the Defender (D*) prefers maximum
adjustment by the Challenger, but minimal adjustment of its own behavior. Points D’
Fig. 1 Spatial analysis of the CM situation
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and C′ denote the respective unilateral outcomes where Challenger and Defender free
themselves of all constraints, even within their own groups; these points will not
directly enter our analysis.
Throughout our modeling exercise we assume linear utility functions, where an
actor’s utility decreases proportionately to the distance of an outcome from its respec-
tive ideal point. The utility of the Defender from an institutional outcome X is thus
given by the utility function UXD ¼ −d D*;X
 
and the utility function of the Challeng-
er by UXC ¼ −d C*;X
 
−c f . In both cases, the component d(A∗; X) stands for the
Euclidean distance between outcome X and actor A’s ideal point (where A is either
Defender D or Challenger C). The component cf denotes the fixed costs accrued by the
Challenger in case it chooses to engage in CM, as discussed above.
As the third and last key feature, we are able to locate in our model the two most
important possible states of the actors’ interaction when CM is considered by the
Challenger. The first is the initial status quo. The 45-degree line in Fig. 1 identifies
all points of possible agreement between Challenger and Defender that are equitable.
Because the initial status quo favors the Defender, it is located in the triangle below the
45-degree line. We will assume that it lies within the colored area delineated by the
Challenger’s indifference curve cutting through the CM reversion point (i.e. within the
arc centered at the Challenger’s ideal point). We mark the status quo with SQ1. If it
were to lie outside the circle, the status quo would be extremely biased, allocating
(almost) all gains to the Defender. Then a move to CM would be immediately
beneficial to the Challenger and the situation would not be particularly interesting from
an analytical point of view.
The second crucial point in Fig. 1 is the exercise of CM itself, understood as a
reaction to the initial failure of institutional adjustment bargaining. When the Chal-
lenger fails to convince the Defender to agree to an adjustment of the focal institution, it
seeks to break the deadlock and to realize its interests by setting up a new institution or
by shifting activities to an existing one which better reflects its preferences. It thus
departs from the prescribed behavioral pattern in the focal institution, shifting towards
its ideal point, C*. This point reflects the agreement within the Challenger group on a
smaller amount of required behavioral adjustment among its members. Expectedly, the
Defender will respond in kind to avoid being a “sucker” in the focal cooperation
arrangement. It will shift to the level of behavioral adjustment corresponding to D*.
Both actors thus converge to a less cooperative outcome (C*, D*), corresponding to the
Nash equilibrium in a classical one-off prisoner’s dilemma game. Under this point,
labeled CM, both groups free themselves from much of the constraints formerly
imposed by the rules enshrined in the focal institution. For the sake of completeness,
we can also identify analogously the complete cooperation breakdown situation,
located at the intersection of the Defender’s and Challenger’s unilateral options (C′,
D’).7
The model highlights that the move to CM brings about sizable costs. It manifestly
lowers the cooperation gains for the Defender, whose utility drops drastically, as the
CM outcome is significantly farther away from its ideal point than the initial status quo.
More interestingly, it also lowers the cooperation gains for the Challenger. The size of
7 In our model, this outcome does not directly enter the actors’ calculations, as they can always count on
cooperation at least within their respective groups.
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the long-term loss of its gains depends on how biased the initial status quo was, but
unless the initial bias was extreme, providing (almost) all gains to the Defender, the
Challenger is bound to face immediate losses as both actors move to the inefficient non-
cooperative CM situation. This is all the more the case because of the fixed transaction
costs of establishing the new institution, or engaging in the shift to an already existing
institution. These fixed transaction costs are denoted by the larger arc centered at C*. In
sum, Fig. 1 shows that unless the status quo is extremely biased in favor of the
Defender, the resort to CM results in a net loss for both Challenger and Defender.
Under all circumstances it represents a collective loss. We formalize our reasoning in
the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Compared to following the status quo, the resort to CM brings about an
immediate loss of gains reaped collectively by the challengers and defenders, and
under all but the most extreme initial situations also for each group individually.
As hinted at above, Fig. 1 also highlights that how sizable the costs of CM
are depends on how cooperative the status quo actually was. If the status quo
lay on or close to the contract line connecting points C* and D*, such as SQ1,
the losses would be more sizable than e.g. from the point located at SQ2. This
is very important, because – even if CM is not exercised – the focal institution
is unlikely to maintain its performance and to ensure high levels of compliance
in the long term, if the cooperation gains that it creates continue to be
distributed in a highly asymmetric way. In case the increasing dissatisfaction
of the Challenger leads to declining compliance with the provisions of the focal
institution, the status quo would rather shift, over time, from the more cooper-
ative situations to those with fewer cooperation gains produced, such as at SQ2.
Under these circumstances, a choice of CM would represent a lower decline in
cooperation gains.
Since a static spatial model does not allow us to account for such temporal
dynamics, the appendix to this article presents an extensive computer simulation
in which the spatial model is translated into an iterated game. The computer
simulation evaluates the Defender’s and Challenger’s long-term discounted
gains (or costs) from pursuing CM, in contrast to sticking to the focal institu-
tion, over high number of interaction rounds. The simulation allows us to
conclude that the central theoretical claims developed so far hold not only in
the static constellation depicted by the spatial model, but also when the
temporal dynamics described above are taken into account.
4 CM as a credible signal and institutional adjustment bargaining
in a new environment
Having discussed the effects of CM that are detrimental to cooperation, this
Section develops our theoretical framework further by elaborating on those effects of
CM that are conducive to cooperation. First, we demonstrate why CM sends a credible
signal of a challenger’s resolve to contest the institutional status quo, altering the
informational and strategic environment of institutional adjustment bargaining. Second,
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by outlining a path through which inter-institutional accommodation between focal and
challenging institution can be accomplished, we show how the previously lost cooper-
ation gains can be re-created.
4.1 CM as credible signaling
In our theoretical logic, CM results from a deadlock in institutional adjustment
bargaining caused by the inability of a challenger to credibly communicate to a
defender its level of resolve to contest the institutional status quo. At the same time,
the very act of CM dramatically reduces the information asymmetry problem. As CM
constitutes a highly credible signal of the challengers’ resolve to contest the status quo,
it helps ameliorate the conditions that led to its exercise in the first place.
In political communication a signal is credible to the degree that it is (potentially)
costly for the actor who sends it (Fearon 1995; Morrow 1999). Within institutional
adjustment bargaining, then, the communication of the challengers’ resolve is credible
if it leads them to suffer a loss of cooperation gains. In line with this expectation,
challengers have a set of mechanisms at their disposal to communicate to defenders
their resolve to contest the institutional status quo. First, they may utter dissatisfaction
within the existing institution, that is, exercise “voice”. Since the costs attached to mere
voice expression are usually low, they constitute little more than cheap talk. Thus,
challengers communicate only a low level of resolve when exercising it. Second, and
more profoundly, challengers may gradually stop complying with the rules enshrined in
the focal institution. In contrast to “voice,” gradual non-compliance reduces coopera-
tion gains. However, the gradual nature of the process strips it of its ability to credibly
signal an immediate, high level of resolve. On the contrary, the lengthiness of the
process may indicate, at least in the short term, that the challenger is in fact unready to
resolutely confront the institutional status quo with radical disruptive action. The same
is true if challengers start to obstruct the institution’s decision-making or to block
individual operations.
Third, challengers may decide to exercise CM. As we discussed above, such a
choice is politically risky and immediately costly for challengers. It imposes on them
the sizable costs of institutional creation (with competitive regime creation) or adjust-
ment (with regime shifting). Most profoundly, in the long-term, CM reduces the
cooperation gains by deliberately creating “strategic inconsistency” (rivaling rules)
which breaks the convergence of expectations about states’ behavior (Raustiala and
Victor 2004: 301–302). It raises the transaction costs of cooperation as “strategic
inconsistency” (rivaling rules) creates the need to navigate through a thicker, less
organized and therefore more confusing web of institutionalized rules.
Taking into account all these costs, and its rather abrupt nature, a high level of
credibility is inherent in exercising CM. In other words, only highly resolved actors
may be expected to exercise CM in order to contest a given institutional status quo.8 It
thus eliminates much of the information asymmetry problem that led the challengers to
8 In this vein, while challengers have an incentive to claim they will pursue CM even when unwilling or
unable to do so (Morse and Keohane 2014: 391), only the exercise of CM reduces cooperation gains. That is,
only its actual pursuance is costly and thus able to send to the defenders a credible signal of the challengers’
resolve (Fearon 1995).
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exercise CM in the first place. Moreover, CM can be read as testifying to the
challengers’ seriousness about institutionalized cooperation. That is, the exercise of
CM signals a commitment to multilateralism as opposed to reverting to unilateralism or
bilateralism. It thus shows the degree of the challengers’ resolve to contest the status
quo, but it also highlights their readiness to engage in multilateral cooperation, albeit on
more equitable terms.
To be sure, the exercise of CM also creates benefits for the challengers, if it is
conducted successfully. Under regime shifting, they gain the opportunity to approach
an issue from the governance objective of a different international institution. Under
competitive regime creation, the challengers gain the opportunity to design a new
institutional arrangement according to their own interests and power resources. How-
ever, the fact that these benefits may become available to the challengers, if CM is
carried out successfully, does not alter the key underlying nature of CM. It represents a
mechanism that creates principal costs by reducing the degree of mutually beneficial
behavioral adjustment among actors and, by implication, the predictability of their
behavior. In spite of specific immediate benefits, the key effect of CM is the break-up
of the convergence of actors’ expectations, as highlighted in Fig. 1. Unless cooperation
between the challengers and the defenders re-emerges at some point, the costs associ-
ated with CM clearly outweigh the benefits.
When CM is exercised successfully, institutional adjustment bargaining can be
expected to re-open. At this point, the positive effects of CM start to materialize. First,
the fundamental uncertainty about the challengers’ resolve will have been dramatically
reduced. The bargaining may thus become more information-rich and efficient
(Narlikar and Van Houten 2010). Second, the act of CM changes the strategic envi-
ronment within which institutional adjustment bargaining takes place. Compared to the
previous situation, the challengers’ bargaining position is now stronger and the de-
fenders cannot hope to one-sidedly dominate institutional adjustment bargaining. CM
not only boosts the credibility of the challengers’ position but also provides an
alternative institution within which they can independently realize at least some
cooperation gains. In short, CM improves the challengers’ outside options. Moreover,
by creating rivaling rules (“strategic inconsistency”), CM imposes negative externali-
ties on the defenders, as it weakens their ability to reap the gains they used to reap in the
focal institution. All in all, thus, the act of CM re-opens the deadlocked institutional
adjustment bargaining, though on different terms, that is, with two competing
institutions.
4.2 The path to re-creating cooperation gains
If cooperation gains are to be re-created, the two competing sets of provisions need to
be brought into (at least partial) conformity. A working compromise between the two
institutions needs to be found.
On the one hand, both defenders and challengers prefer such institutional realign-
ment and the re-creation of cooperation gains to enduring “strategic inconsistency”. In
spite of having achieved their target of establishing rivaling rules, the challengers
remain members of the focal institution. As long as their conflict with the defenders
reduces the amount of cooperation gains, they are able to reap, as discussed in
Section 3, the challengers gain an interest in the operability of both institutions and,
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by implication, in realigning the rivaling rules. The same applies to the defenders who
lost sizably due to the exercise of CM, and now gain a chance to reclaim parts of the
lost cooperation gains. One the other hand, each group favors a different form of
institutional realignment: the defenders favor a solution close to the cooperative
arrangement established by the focal institution, while the challengers prefer a solution
close to the cooperative arrangement realized by the institution that they used or created
to exercise CM. Thus, the two sides find themselves in a “Battle of the Sexes” situation
(Snidal 1985: 931–936; Fearon 1998).
A solution to this particular Battle of the Sexes problem can be reached through a
process of gradual inter-institutional accommodation. That is, the issue can be solved
within a sequential game where, in each stage, partial concessions are exchanged and
the newly created gains are cemented. Analogous to the classical logic of “the evolution
of cooperation” (Axelrod 1981; Axelrod and Keohane 1985), a series of piecemeal
institutional adjustments may, over time, lead to a realignment of the regulatory
activities of the rivaling institutions. Thus, what we have in mind is an evolutionary
process within which either defenders or challengers start to accommodate their own
institution, through formal and collectively binding adjustments of rule sets, in ways
that gradually eliminate strategic inconsistency, and the other side then responds in kind
by adapting its institution accordingly. Figure 2 visualizes our reasoning in the spatial
model presented earlier in Fig. 1. The initial cooperative arrangement, the status quo,
dissolved into two competing institutions under CM. Due to the signaling quality of
Fig. 2 The path of contested multilateralism: from status quo, to reversion point, to a new inter-institutional
arrangement
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CM, institutional adjustment bargaining (IAB) can now be reopened under altered
informational and strategic circumstances. In an iterative process marked with points
IAB1-IAB8, a new cooperation scheme may emerge over time. As discussed
above, both camps are similarly powerful, and since they reach the new
cooperative arrangement in a highly iterated setting, the latter is likely to
distribute cooperation gains symmetrically. This possible outcome, marked as
“New inter-institutional arrangement” in Fig. 2, expresses the core of the
positive effect CM may have on cooperation.
The outcome of inter-institutional complementarity may take two basic forms. First,
inter-institutional accommodation may lead the (formerly) rivaling institutions to
exercise their respective governance functions in mutually complementary ways. That
is, the process may lead to the emergence of an institution-overarching governance
system that accommodates the formerly rivaling institutions. By implication, both
institutions continue to operate in the area of overlap, but they find the means to
resolve their rivalry in a way that enables complementary co-governance. Second, the
process of inter-institutional accommodation may lead the overlapping institutions to
delimit their jurisdictions in a way that effectively eliminates overlap and, by implica-
tion, their rivalry. If it is realized in this form, inter-institutional accommodation
dissolves the area of overlap by subdividing it into distinct parts that are each governed
exclusively by one institution (Gehring and Oberthür 2009).
No matter which of these two forms of inter-institutional complementarity is
reached, the cooperation gains that got lost through the pursuance of CM can be
recreated in two steps. First, CM helps to reopen deadlocked institutional adjustment
bargaining, since it provides a credible signal of the true level of the challengers’
resolve. Second, after CM has taken place, the two groups of actors involved may
engage in a process of gradual inter-institutional accommodation because they will
share an interest in reaping previously lost cooperation gains. Taken together, these two
critical features of CM lead us to formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 2 CM may have positive long-term effects on cooperation because it
conveys a credible signal of the challengers’ resolve, which helps break deadlock in
institutional adjustment bargaining, and induces a process of mutually complementary
institutional adaptation.
Similar to Proposition 1, Fig. 2 highlights that the ability of actors to recreate
cooperation gains that got lost initially due to CM will depend on timing, in particular
on how long it takes them to reach inter-institutional complementarity. If actors are able
to reach the state of complementarity very soon after the exercise of CM, only a few
gains will be lost. By contrast, if they are stuck in the non-cooperative CM outcome for
long and inter-institutional complementarity is only slowly arrived at, the costs of CM
will be higher.
Since the static spatial model does not allow us to capture the temporal dynamic of
this process (compare Section 3.3), the appendix to this article presents a computer
simulation which explicitly adopts a dynamic perspective. This computer simulation
lends support to the reasoning developed in this Section that the cooperation gains that
got lost through the exercise of CM may be recreated, if CM triggers a process of
mutually complementary institutional adaptation. Moreover, it identifies the conditions
under which this is the case. In sum, the computer simulation provides a robustness
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check that the theoretical reasoning developed in Section 4 holds not only in a static,
but also in a dynamic setting.
5 The effects of CM on patterns of cooperation: Empirical analysis
In this Section, we present two case studies to probe the plausibility of our theoretical
reasoning: from development finance, the case of the WB and the AIIB, and from
international trade, the case of the WTO and the CBD. As is well-known, plausibility
probes serve an important function in theory development as an intermediate step
between hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing (Eckstein 1975). They are
particularly suitable to advance “[n] ew and relatively untested research programs,”
such as the one on cooperation in a thickly institutionalized international system
(George and Bennett 2005: 251).
The empirical cases studied in the remainder of this section are selected from a
universe of cases which encompasses all those instances in which a group of states
which was dissatisfied with the distribution of cooperation gains within an existing
focal institution decided to exercise CM after institutional adjustment bargaining had
failed. Out of this universe of cases, we selected two empirical cases according to the
following criteria: First, we chose to analyze cases which allow us to maximize
variation on a range of dimensions that we expect to have a systematic effect on how
the exercise of CM impacts the realization of cooperation gains. Thus, our two cases
include a) both variants of CM: “competitive regime creation” (development finance)
and “regime-shifting” (trade in GMOs), b) strategic interaction between different types
of actors: in the WB/AIIB case, a group of established powers led by the US interacts
with a group of rising powers led by China, whereas in the WTO/CBD case, both
groups are led by established powers, namely the US and the EU; c) “strategic
inconsistency” not only in different issue-areas, but also between different types of
international institutions: the WB and the AIIB fulfill operative purposes, whereas the
WTO and the CBD perform regulatory functions, d) the two different types of inter-
institutional accommodation described in Section 4.2: co-governance in the WB/AIIB
case and jurisdictional delimitation in the WTO/CBD case. Second, by selecting cases
which both feature significant distributional conflicts between major powers, we made
sure that we analyze empirical cases which are not biased towards our theoretical
argument that, under certain conditions, CM can have a positive effect on international
cooperation. While we do not claim that these cases constitute “least-likely cases” for
our theoretical argument, we are confident that, since both of them feature distributional
conflicts between major powers, they are not biased towards a positive outcome.
Having selected our cases according to these criteria enables us to claim that our two
empirical case studies corroborate a theoretical argument that applies to a broader
universe of cases (see Conclusion for scope conditions) without subjecting it to a
rigorous test.
In each case study, we start by highlighting the nature of the conflict between
defenders and challengers, then continue to describe the process of CM and identify
the costs involved in the process, in line with our Proposition 1. After that, we turn to
the process of inter-institutional accommodation theorized in Proposition 2.
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5.1 CM in the global governance of development finance: The WB and the AIIB
On 16 January 2016, a group of 57 states led by China opened the AIIB for business.
This exercise of CM in the form of “competitive regime creation” resulted primarily
from China’s efforts to put pressure on the defenders of the institutional status quo in
the WB.9 It was a reaction to a reform of voting shares in the WB that proved
insufficient to accommodate the rise of China and other Non-Western states, continuing
to severely under-represent them, in their view (Yang 2016: 766).10 In this regard, the
creation of the AIIB was analogous to the creation of the NDB by the five BRICS
countries.
How did China arrive at this exercise of CM? Starting in 2010, China vehemently
voiced discontent that its increase in economic power and financial contribution to the
WB did not translate into greater WB vote shares.11 True, the WB underwent a “voice
reform” to increase the voting powers of developing states. In 2010, the Bank an-
nounced that developing and transition countries increase their voting power from
42.60 to 47.19% and developed countries reduce their share from 57.40 to 52.81% as
part of a deal struck during the Great Recession (Vestergaard andWade 2015: 6). China
thus became the largest shareholder after the US, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, and
Mexico. Nevertheless, the changes in the WB’s decision-making rules did not satisfy
the world’s second largest economy’s longing for more equitable vote distribution. Its
efforts to redistribute influence in the WB more significantly were proving
unsuccessful.
To be sure, the creation of the AIIB was motivated also by the desire to close the
funding gap in regard to infrastructure development in Asia (estimated to be about $8
trillion between 2010 and 2020) that existing institutions proved unable to close
(Reisen 2015). However, if China’s primary objective would have been to boost
funding in infrastructure development in Asia, a much less costly and risky solution
would have been to increase its capital subscription to the Asian Development Bank,
which already spent more than half of its budget on infrastructure (Wilson 2019: 165).
However, China decided to take the more demanding path, creating the AIIB, to
demonstrate its resolve to contest the institutional status quo in the WB.12
As a result, on October 24, 2014, China signed an agreement to establish the AIIB
together with 21 Asian states which are simultaneously members of the World Bank.
Especially given the US campaign against joining the AIIB, it was by no means certain
that the AIIB would be able to attract many members (Freeman 2019). It was therefore
not only costly but also risky for China to exercise CM by establishing the AIIB. In
9 China not only proposed the AIIB, but is also its largest financial contributor, holds veto power on all
questions relating to the governance of the Bank and hosts its permanent headquarter.
10 Moreover, institutional reform in the IMF was stalled in the US Congress for five years. Some commen-
tators, such as Oliver Blanchard, former Chief Economist of the IMF, and Larry Summers, former Chief
Economist of the World Bank, consider the long delay in the implementation of the IMF reform as an integral
part of the dissatisfaction with the institutional status quo that led China to create the AIIB (Mackintosh 2016:
27–28; Summers 2015). For the theoretical argument of this paper it does not matter whether China’s
dissatisfaction with the institutional status quo referred to the WB alone or to both Bretton Woods institutions.
11 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview
12 Importantly for our argument, China chose to create a multilateral development bank. Alternatively, it could
have decided to use its policy banks, such as the China Development Bank and China EXIM Bank to close the
infrastructure gap in Asia. That it created the AIIB instead signifies a commitment to multilateral cooperation.
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spite of that, the Bank proved able to attract considerable support in other world
regions, most notably in Europe.13 Today, the AIIB has 102 approved members (which
include many members of the WB and some close allies of the US), making it the
world’s second-largest MDB. With an initial paid-in capital stock of $100 billion, the
AIIB focuses on international development financing for infrastructure projects in the
Asian region.
At the same time, China enjoys a dominant position in the Bank. It possesses
26.64% of the vote shares, which contrasts with the 4.45% of the vote shares it holds
in the WB.14 Thus, the creation of the AIIB increased the leverage of China (and other
Non-Western members) within the WB. In short, China resorted to “competitive regime
creation” in response to its dissatisfaction with the institutional status quo in the WB
and a reform of its governance structure which it perceived to be too meager (Knoerich
and Urdinez 2019: 341, 353).
In line with Proposition 1, a number of negative effects on international cooperation
in development finance was expected by major actors. The worry of many was that by
giving Non-Western borrowers more institutional choices, the AIIB weakened the
bargaining position of Western donors and the WB’s enforcement mechanism. The
availability of an alternative source of developing financing means that borrowing
countries have weaker incentives to comply with the terms and conditions set out by the
WB (Reisen 2015: 88).
To highlight the perceived dangers represented by the AIIB’s creation to the existing
order, China’s exercise of CM has been described as “a masterful diplomatic coup,
arguably the most ambitious project of multilateral institution-building to be accom-
plished by a non-Western power after the end of the Cold War” (Andornino 2019:
605). The AIIB constitutes “China’s first major foray into leading an international
organization with global membership” and thus “an extraordinary development in
global governance” (Gutner 2019: 2). At the same time, it has been seen as being part
of “China’s shadow global diplomacy that aims at undermining the U.S.-led gover-
nance structures established after World War II” (Reisen 2015: 82). Thus, some
commentators speculated that the establishment of the AIIB might lead to a “world
of fragmented governance” (Subacchi 2015). In the Washington Post, Larry Summers
wrote that “[t] his past month may be remembered as the moment the US lost its role as
the underwriter of the global economic system. . . I can think of no event since Bretton
Woods comparable to the combination of China’s effort to establish a major new
institution and the failure of the US to persuade dozens of its traditional allies, starting
with Britain, to stay out” (Summers 2015).
According to the 2019 White Paper on the Defense of Japan, China’s regional rival
interprets the creation of the AIIB as representing Beijing’s attempt to create “its own
international order.” On an issue-area specific level, commentators feared that the
establishment of the AIIB signifies the creation of an institutional structure that
competes against the World Bank as the central institution of development finance
(Subacchi 2015; The Economist 2014). More precisely, it was argued that the AIIB
may serve to institutionalize a “Beijing Consensus,” based on the norm of non-
13 After having first ignored the discussions to create the AIIB, the US aimed at limiting the AIIB to a “minor
regional bank with a small membership” (Chow 2016: 1275).
14 https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html
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interference with the internal affairs of countries, which competes against the “Wash-
ington Consensus,” based on the norm of conditional lending (Chow 2016: 1263). The
US in particular feared that the AIIB would be characterized by standards for environ-
mental and social safeguards, transparency and accountability that diverge from those
prevalent in the WB and, thus, reduce the joint gains realized through institutionalized
cooperation in international development finance by reintroducing uncertainty about
the behavior of lenders and borrowers alike (Desierto 2015). In other words, as
Proposition 1 leads us to expect, the expectation was that diverging conditionalities
across the two banks induce a race to the bottom in the standards of international
development finance and, by implication, lessen behavioral adaptation by the bor-
rowers to the preferences of the lenders and vice versa (Knoerich and Urdinez 2019:
357). In short, the expectation was that diverging conditionalities turn out to be
detrimental to development.
However, in line with our theory and Proposition 2, the effects of the creation of the
AIIB on international cooperation are anything but unequivocal. The very creation of
the AIIB almost immediately triggered a process of inter-institutional accommodation
between the two development banks. Thus, actually, only relatively few cooperation
gains got lost, which is completely in line with our theory (see Section 4.2). To start
with, China was only able to attract a global membership because it started to work
towards inter-institutional accommodation with the WB early in the process of exercis-
ing CM (Rodrigues Vieira 2018; Wilson 2019).15 The members of the WB, in
particular those with strong ties to the US, demanded a commitment to established
norms and practices in multilateral development finance (Freeman 2019: 668, 670). In
practice, they demanded that the AIIB is set up in a way that ensures at least basic
complementarity with the WB and thus prevents large losses of cooperation gains due
to a “race to the bottom” in the international standards of development finance.16
The ensuing process of inter-institutional accommodation manifested itself in two
main ways. First, with the exception of the non-resident board of directors, the
governance structure of the AIIB closely resembles the governance structure of the
WB (Wilson 2019: 164). This is unsurprising because the AIIB used the WB mandate
15 Initial members included “predominantly small, developing countries in South, Southeast and West Asia”
(Wilson 2019: 160). Only inter-institutional accommodation enabled countries such as the UK, Germany,
Italy, France, Switzerland, Australia, Korea, Brazil and Canada to join in at a later point. At this point, 4 of the
G7 countries, 14 of the G20 countries, and 12 members of the European Union (EU) have joined the AIIB
(Wilson 2019: 162). As a result, the membership of the AIIB includes all major world economies with the
exceptions of the US and Japan.
16 One may object that the desire to make the rules and procedures of the AIIB reasonably compatible with the
WB significantly compromises the credibility of the signal that the challengers have sent to the defenders by
creating the AIIB. Such an objection has merit. Our theoretical reasoning clearly implies that if the AIIB was
designed in a way less compatible with the WB, the challengers would have signaled their resolve to contest
the institutional status quo more strongly. That said, we maintain that setting up a completely new international
institution still sends a credible signal of dissatisfaction and resolve when outright incompatibility is avoided.
After all, China and its partners have shown that they are willing to invest the costs and to face the risks that
are involved in creating a new international institution that enters the sphere of competence of an existing focal
institution (see Section 3.2). In doing so, they have furthermore gained the ability to act independently of the
defenders within an institutional framework which is, by and large, under their control. As a result, they are in
a much better position to impose costs on the defenders of the institutional status quo than they were before the
creation of the AIIB. Notwithstanding the fact that both banks are reasonably compatible at present, China and
its partners could relatively easily reduce compatibility and use the AIIB to attack the WB, if this turns out to
be conducive to their preferences in the future.
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as a template for its own regulatory framework (Lichtenstein 2018).17 Second, inter-
institutional accommodation between the AIIB and the WB is institutionalized in
Memoranda of Understanding. The AIIB has developed a formal partnership with the
WB which includes agreements on co-financing, knowledge-sharing, technical coop-
eration, risk management, policy strategy and staff exchanges, among others (AIIB
2019; World Bank 2017; see also Freeman 2019: 668). As a result, the AIIB and the
WB became able to co-finance projects efficiently. Since the AIIB started to operate in
2016, a “significant portion of the AIIB’s projects” have been co-financed with the WB
(Freeman 2019: 672).18 Within these arrangements, AIIB and WB agreed on joint
supervision during project implementation with the WB being the lead supervisor (e.g.
AIIB 2016). The AIIB, for its part, regards the WB loan conditions as “satisfactory”
(AIIB 2017) and even “rel [ies] on the WB’s determination of compliance with the […]
WB policies and procedures” (AIIB 2016: 5). Both development banks effectively
ensure environmental and social standards as part of project implementations. In sum,
not only does the AIIB’s governance structure resemble that of the WB, but also are its
operations compatible, and executed jointly, with the WB. Thus, the inter-bank coop-
eration institutionalized in the Memoranda of Understanding arguably demands more
inter-institutional adjustment from the AIIB than from the WB.
This case illustrates well the emergence of an institution-overarching governance
arrangement that encompasses the two formerly rivaling institutions, as one of the two
pathways to inter-institutional complementarity developed in Section 4.2. The exercise
of CM through the creation of the AIIB by a group of states led by China started as a
direct challenge to the WB, but resulted in a process of inter-institutional accommoda-
tion between the two institutions. During this process, China has adapted its behavior to
the preferences of those members of the AIIB that are simultaneously members of the
WB (Knoerich and Urdinez 2019). Likewise, then US President Barack Obama
backtracked on earlier US hostilities toward the AIIB by saying ‘let me be very clear
and dispel this notion that we were opposed or are opposed to other countries
participating in the [AIIB.…We] look forward to collaborating with the [AIIB], just
like we do with the [Asian Development Bank] and with the [WB]’ (Obama 2015).
Thus, also the US has adapted its behavior to the preferences of those members of the
WB that are simultaneously members of the AIIB.
While it may be still relatively early to say, the AIIB seems to have become a
“broad-based multilateral institution” with “transparent governance arrangements” that
has adopted “policies consistent with international best practices for development
financing” (Wilson 2019: 151). In many regards, it has transformed itself from a
competitor with, to a collaborator of, the WB (Wilson 2019: 151). Against this
backdrop, we acknowledge that the process of mutually complementary inter-
institutional accommodation implies more accommodation on the part of the AIIB
than on the part of the WB. While the central task of this case study has been to
demonstrate that the evolving relationship between WB and AIIB has led to inter-
institutional accommodation rather than to permanent competition or outright conflict,
17 The AIIB mandate was established under the guidance of Natalie Lichtenstein, a former senior official at the
WB. This is the most prominent example of China’s approach to draw on the expertise of seasoned WB staff
to hammer out and also to manage the AIIB (Yang 2016: 764).
18 As of July 2019, 45% of the investment operations approved by the AIIB have been prepared by it alone,
whereas 55% have been co-financed with other MDBs (Lichtenstein 2019: 584).
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an important task for future research is to study in greater detail the degree to which
processes of mutually complementary institutional accommodation are (a) symmetrical
across institutions.
5.2 CM in the global governance of trade in GMOs: The WTO and the CBD
Our second case – the governance of trade in GMOs – illustrates the potential of CM to
be conducive to cooperation in a regulatory area, while exploring the second type of
CM, regime-shifting. At the center of the case is the conflict between diverging
regulatory approaches pursued in the US and in the EU to regulate international trade
in GMOs (Drezner 2007: Chapter 6): The US applies the principle of “substantial
equivalence” which treats conventional and genetically modified products equally. The
EU, by contrast, applies the precautionary principle which allows treating both types of
products differently. The precautionary principle legitimizes the introduction of restric-
tive regulatory standards even if there is no sound scientific proof that GMOs are
hazardous (Vogel 2003). Those regulatory standards are, however, perceived as non-
tariff barriers to trade by the focal institution of international trade, the WTO. Accord-
ing to WTO rules, international trade in GMOs may only be restricted if the hazard-
ousness of a product is either proven by a sound scientific analysis or based on the
standards of pertinent international institutions.
The regulation of international trade in GMOs therefore features a strong distribu-
tional conflict between the exporters of GMOs (led by the US) and their importers (led
by the EU) (Drezner 2007: Chapter 6). Since the rules initially institutionalized within
the WTO revolve around the principle of “substantial equivalence,” the gains realized
through cooperation in this focal institution were distributed unevenly among importers
and exporters of GMOs (Pollack and Shaffer 2009: Chapter 4). Thus, GMO-importing
countries became dissatisfied with the institutional status quo. However, institutional
change in the focal WTO proved impossible.
In response to this stalemate, around the turn of the millennium, the importers
decided to shift the process of institutional adjustment from the intra-institutional to
the cross-institutional level by exercising “regime-shifting”. More precisely, they
moved their efforts to adjust the rules that govern trade in GMOs from the WTO to
the CBD (Schneider and Urpelainen 2013). By deliberately creating “strategic incon-
sistency” with the pertinent WTO rules, the importers increased pressure on the
exporters (Drezner 2005: 853–855). As expected, the GMO-exporting countries were
opposed to these efforts and to adopting the so-called Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,
in particular to institutionalizing the precautionary principle within it (Graff 2002:
411).19 Thus, the US and Canada countered the “regime-shifting” of the GMO-
importers by putting the regulation of international trade in GMOs on the agenda of
the WTO Ministerial in Seattle. However, the negotiations within the WTO failed,
because importing countries pointed to ongoing negotiations within the CBD frame-
work (Falkner 2000: 305).
19 The Cartagena Protocol aims to ensure the safe handling, transport and use of living modified organisms
(LMOs) resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on biological diversity, taking
also into account risks to human health.
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The adoption of the Cartagena Protocol allowed the members of the CBD to restrict
international trade in GMOs more strongly on the basis of legitimate interests in the
protection from hazards than the pertinent WTO rules.20 Thus, by allowing GMO-
importing countries to resort to precautionary measures, it serves as “a counterweight to
the WTO SPS Agreement’s narrower focus on science-based regulatory measures”
(Pollack and Shaffer 2009: 156–157). As a result, states (in particular GMO-importers)
gained greater leeway in determining their own regulatory rules.
In line with our Proposition 1, costs accrued to both sides. Regulating the relation-
ship between the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol was subject to long and controver-
sial negotiations which did not lead to a clear result. In essence, those negotiations
failed because of the prevailing distributional conflict between importers (defending the
rules of the Cartagena Protocol) and exporters (defending the WTO rules). As Drezner
concludes, “[t] he result is a legal stalemate, with the Biosafety Protocol’s precautionary
principle flatly contradicting the trade regime’s norm of scientific proof of harm”
(Drezner 2005: 854).
This stalemate reduced the stability of states’ expectations in regard to the regulation
of international trade in GMOs. By implication, it reduced the realized joint gains
(Pollack and Shaffer 2009: 117–119). The rivalry of both regulatory principles caused a
fragmentation of the international markets for products that include GMOs. This
fragmentation of markets, in turn, led to decreasing economies of scale, which
contradicted the interests of exporting countries. At the same time, rivaling rules
undermined the protection of consumers and the environment from the hazards ema-
nating from GMOs. In sum, the exercise of CM by the GMO-importing countries
turned out to be costly for both importers and exporters because it reduced the realized
cooperation gains. Moreover, since the Cartagena Protocol created the need to navigate
through a thicker, less organized and therefore more confusing web of institutionalized
rules, it increased the transaction costs of regulating international trade in GMOs for
importers and exporters alike. Thus, the exercise of CM by the GMO importers sent a
credible signal of their resolve to contest the institutional status quo.
At the same time, in line with Proposition 2, both groups of actors developed an
interest in mutually complementary institutional accommodation which would enable
them to reap more cooperation gains than under continued “strategic inconsistency”
(rivaling rules) between the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol. However, based on their
diverging regulatory principles, both groups had diverging preferences in regard to how
inter-institutional accommodation should be arranged. Thus, they found themselves in
a “Battle of the Sexes” situation.
Given the sustained divergence of regulatory principles in the two groups of states, a
process of mutually complementary institutional accommodation between the WTO
and the Cartagena Protocol was triggered. The institutional adaptation of the Protocol to
20 Article 10 (6) of the CBD stipulates that “Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific
information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism
on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import, taking also into account
risks to human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the
import of the living modified organism in question as referred to in paragraph 3 above, in order to avoid or
minimize such potential adverse effects.” And Article 11(8) adds that “[…] a lack of scientific certainty shall
not prevent a party from taking measures to avoid or minimize potential adverse effects of GMOs to be
imported as food or feed.”
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the pertinent WTO-rules is reflected, first, in the attempt to make the rules of the
Protocol as compatible with the WTO as possible, the “strategic inconsistency”
between the two regulatory approaches notwithstanding. The design of the Protocol
reflects the “chill effect” which implies that, given that the WTO enjoyed a “first mover
advantage” on regulating trade in GMOs, the Cartagena Protocol, as the second mover,
was designed by its members to at least partially prevent outright contradiction
(Eckersley 2004). Moreover, institutional adaptation is reflected in the restricted area
of application of the Protocol’s central regulatory instrument – the Advance Informed
Agreement (AIA) – which implies that the Protocol does not apply to a considerable
part of trade in GMOs (Eggers and Mackenzie 2000: 526).
On the side of theWTO, the search for complementarity provedmore problematic, as
the deadlock in the Doha Round made it impossible for the WTO to react to the creation
of the Cartagena Protocol through its legislative body. However, the institutional
adaptation of the WTO to the Cartagena Protocol could be pursued by its judicial body.
In the Biotech case between the EU and the US, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement
Mechanism decided that every country can decide independently how stringently it
regulates its own market (World Trade Organization 2006). This decision responds to
the claim put forward by three GMO-exporting countries (the US, Canada and Argen-
tina) that the restrictive regulations of the EU are incompatible with WTO law
(Lieberman and Gray 2008: 38–40). It emphasizes that pertinent WTO rules provide a
basis to put in place precautionary measures even when risk assessment has not reached
a conclusive or unequivocal result (Krisch 2010: 196). The decision repeatedly takes up
the consequences of scientific uncertainty and accepts that GMO-importing states may
take scientific risk assessment into account (World Trade Organization 2006: 7.3044).
This decision clearly diverges from previous decisions which rejected the precau-
tionary principle (Schneider and Urpelainen 2013). Over an extended period of time,
the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism had consistently decided that environmen-
tally motivated trade restrictions – such as those enshrined in the Cartagena Protocol –
contradict the central principles on which the liberal trade order is built (Schoenbaum
2002: 701–703). This strongly suggests that the novel decision adopted in the Biotech
case indeed responds to the “strategic inconsistency” created when GMO-importing
countries shifted their regulatory efforts to the CBD. In line with our Proposition 2, it
adapts the WTO to the “strategic inconsistency” created by the Cartagena Protocol and
thus contributes to mutually complementary inter-institutional accommodation. In
combination with the limitations of the Protocol’s applicability mentioned above, the
steps by the WTO lead to a de facto split of the area of overlap between the two
institutions. The accommodation process by the two institutions thus represents an
example of the second type of inter-institutional complementarity where the bodies
seek to demarcate their spheres of applicability, limiting the amount of direct overlap
and regulatory rivalry (see Section 4.2).21
21 We acknowledge that the process of institutional accommodation within the WTO has been carried out not
only by the member states (that is, by the defenders of the institutional status quo), but also by an institutional
agent to which member states have delegated decision-making power (the WTO DSB). Though not explicitly
theorized, we expect that such an institutional agent adopts its decisions in a way that, at a minimum, does not
clearly violate the preferences of the defenders (and of the of wider membership). To study much more
thoroughly how institutional agents contribute to inter-institutional accommodation is an important task for
future research (see Conclusion).
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In sum, the outlined process of mutually complementary institutional accommoda-
tion considerably reduced the behavioral uncertainty that characterized the regulation of
international trade in GMOs after the creation of the Cartagena Protocol. It therefore
increased the joint gains that states can reap through institutionalized cooperation.
6 Conclusion
The two case studies presented above corroborate two key theoretical claims: First, CM
not only represents a reaction by the challengers of a given institutional status quo to
deadlocked institutional adjustment bargaining, but also sends a credible signal of their
resolve to contest it. Inherent in this signal is the potential to overcome deadlock by
changing the dynamics of institutional adjustment bargaining. Second, “strategic in-
consistency,” that is, the rivaling rules created by CM, may give rise to a process of
inter-institutional accommodation which results in inter-institutional complementarity.
By that, CM may re-create lost cooperation gains. Although the two case studies do not
allow us to answer more fine-grained questions on processes of inter-institutional
accommodation, such as whether each of the two institutions accommodates equally
to the other, they clearly demonstrate that, in both cases, the exercise of CM led neither
to outright conflict, nor to lasting competition between the institutions, but induced
inter-institutional complementarity.
Our findings suggest that if challengers (e.g. rising powers) choose to engage in CM,
they may very well gain from it, if inter-institutional complementarity is reached. At the
same time, defenders (e.g. established powers) are likely to minimize their losses if they
do not resist adjustments of the incumbent focal institutions. And if institutional
adjustment bargaining indeed fails and CM takes place, it is important that the
defenders (e.g. the established powers) engage pragmatically in the processes seeking
inter-institutional complementarity to regain most of the lost gains. The worst-case
scenario is a permanent lock-in with conflicting sets of provisions and sizable losses of
cooperation gains for both parties.
A set of scope conditions needs to be met for our theoretical reasoning to apply.
While these scope conditions were directly built into the analysis above, we provide a
summary here: First, the gains that are realized through cooperation in an existing focal
institution have to be distributed unevenly among two groups of states; second, the two
groups of states must be able to act collectively vis-à-vis each other which presupposes
that interests converge more strongly within the two groups than across them; third, the
two groups need to be similarly powerful, so that none can impose its preferences on
the other; fourth, the deadlock in institutional adjustment bargaining that gives rise to
the exercise of CM must result from challengers’ inability to credibly communicate the
degree to which they are resolved to challenge defenders over the institutional status
quo; and fifth, after the exercise of CM both groups must be willing to offer reciprocal
concessions via ‘their’ institutions in order to re-create cooperation gains.
Admittedly, these scope conditions are demanding and suggest that, at present, our
theoretical argument does not apply to a large number of empirical cases. However, the
contemporary shift in the global distribution of power leads us to expect that the
empirical importance of our theoretical argument is bound to grow significantly in
the years and decades to come. Apart from that, we may expect that successful
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examples of CM, like the ones studied above, will gradually incentivize more groups of
dissatisfied states to resort to it in the future. Thus, a more rigorous empirical testing of
our theoretical reasoning, which draws on a larger number of cases, is an important task
for future research on “cooperation in a thickly institutionalized international system.”
The two plausibility probes presented above suggest that such testing is warranted.
Future research should also explore how simplifying assumptions included in our
modelling impact the effects of CM on international cooperation.22 Two assumptions
appear most prominent, and promising for further inquiry: First, in our model we
assume that the distribution of power between challengers and defenders is symmetrical
and stable over time. It is, however, conceivable that the distribution of power between
challengers and defenders (especially between rising and established powers) changes
over time. Future research should therefore study how dynamic changes in the distri-
bution of power between challengers and defenders affects the effect of CM on the
realization of cooperation gains. We may expect that a changing distribution of power
makes the interaction between challengers and defenders more difficult. As a result, the
prospect of reaching inter-institutional complementarity through mutually complemen-
tary institutional adaptation becomes less likely. Second, we assume that both chal-
lengers and defenders are internally cohesive groups. It is, however, possible to
envision more complex models of CM which are built on the assumption of partial
incoherence within the two groups. We may expect partial incoherence, for example,
when more than two major powers are involved in the strategic interaction between
challengers and defenders or when a major power in one group incentivizes less
powerful states that belong to the other group not to support the major power which
leads their group. Again, we may expect that reduced internal cohesiveness makes the
interaction between the two groups more difficult. By implication, the prospect of
reaching inter-institutional complementarity becomes less likely.
We also expect that relaxing each of the two simplifying assumptions makes it less
likely that CM is exercised in the first place. As we establish in Section 3.2, the exercise
of CM is a costly and risky endeavor which presupposes the ability to act collectively
on the part of the defenders. Reduced internal cohesiveness among the challengers,
however, reduces their ability to act collectively and, thus, to exercise CM. Likewise, a
more asymmetrical distribution of power in favor of the defenders disincentivizes the
challengers from resorting to CM given that the risks and costs associated with its
exercise are comparatively unlikely to pay off.
Lastly, future research should analyze the contributions institutional agents (e.g.
dispute settlement bodies) can make to processes of inter-institutional accommodation.
Given that international institutions are replete with veto players who can prevent or
stop processes of inter-institutional accommodation (a fact that contributes to inhibiting
this process from becoming more widespread), institutional agents can be particularly
conducive to recreating cooperation gains lost through the exercise of CM (see
Section 5.2). In summary, the phenomenon of CM and its effects on patterns of
international cooperation represents a broad and promising agenda for important future
research on international institutions.
22 We should emphasize, however, that neither perfect internal group coherence, nor complete power
symmetry between the groups are needed for our key insight concerning the collective and individual costs
from CM, formulated in Proposition 1, to hold.
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